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Abstract 
Since the 2000s, the international community has increasingly recognised two basic 
aspects of development cooperation. First, international development cooperation faces a 
systemic crisis. Because of the way it is organised and implemented, it is part of the 
problem it wants solve. As a response, there has been an attempt at system reform that, in 
terms of ambition and recognition, is unprecedented in the history of development 
cooperation. Second, the environment of development cooperation has changed 
considerably. This goes for both the development problematique to which development 
cooperation reacts and the global context in which it operates. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the early 2000s, the international community has come to acknowledge two 
fundamental issues regarding development policy.
1
 The first is that the aid system is in 
crisis. The way it is organised and run has turned it into a part of the problem that it was 
meant to help solve. To overcome this crisis, attempts are being made to reform the 
system to an extent unparalleled in the history of aid in terms of ambition and international 
acceptance. The second issue is that the system environment
2
 in which development 
policy is being pursued has undergone considerable change, both in terms of the 
development issues that this policy is responding to and with regard to the landscape in 
which it is operating. This is something that the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) made unambiguous reference to in its Strategy on 
Development, adopted at the end of May 2012.
3
 
Against this backdrop, it is no surprise to see publications such as “The End of ODA. 
Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy” (Severino / Ray 2009) and Reinventing 
Foreign Aid (Easterly 2008). However, these authors adopt a different outlook than those 
who are fundamentally critical of aid (e.g. Wolff 2005; Easterly 2002, 2006; Moyo 2009; 
Bonner Aufruf 2008, 2009), asserting that it has completely failed and is finished, despite 
having to accept some clear flaws in their own arguments.
4
 The far more conceptually and 
politically discerning question to ask is how aid provision needs to be transformed in 
response to the systemic crisis and the changed system environment in which it finds 
itself. 
This paper discusses the question in two parts. The first (section 2) deals with the crisis in 
the aid system and with its reform, whereas the second (section 3) addresses the 
                                                          
1 There are three levels at which development policy comes into play: (i) the level of partner countries 
(improving local living conditions through development cooperation); (ii) international level 
(involvement in shaping global framework conditions and international regulations in line with 
development goals); (iii) domestic level (improving policy coherence for development, as well as 
providing information and delivering education on development and development cooperation). 
Section 2 of this paper focuses on development cooperation (aid), whereas section 3 examines 
development policy as a whole. Official development assistance (ODA) is finance that is recognised by 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) as public aid. 
2 The term “system” is used pragmatically in this paper – with no connotations of system theory – and points 
simply to the different perspectives in play. It concerns both an inside and an outside perspective on aid. 
3 (i) “The global economic landscape has changed beyond all recognition […].” (ii) “The world’s 
centre of economic gravity is changing and developing economies are among the key drivers of global 
economic growth.” (iii) “There is a growing diversity of growth and development models […].” (iv) 
“The nature of development financing is changing.” (v) “The geography and nature of poverty are 
changing which raises important questions for traditional approaches to development.” (vi) 
“Inequality is an increasing challenge in advanced and developing economies alike […].” (vii) 
“Development challenges are global challenges.” (OECD 2012, 2). 
4 Fundamental critics of aid base their arguments on actual mistakes and failures. However, these 
arguments are flawed for four reasons: (i) they wrongly take the observed deficiencies to be 
characteristic of the aid system as a whole; (ii) they mistakenly equate a lack of development progress 
with the failure of the aid system; (iii) the recommendations they make tend to be one-sided, simplistic 
and factually questionable; (iv) they fail to live up to their claim of offering suitable alternative 
solutions. For more details, see Ashoff (2010a, 30–32). 
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challenges facing development policy as a result of changes in the system environment. 
Section 4 provides a conclusion. 
2 The aid system in crisis and in need of reform  
Somewhere between the beginning and the middle of the last decade, the international 
community concluded that the aid system was in urgent need of reform.
5
 A complex 
agenda to this end was drafted that was guided by the principle of aid effectiveness. The 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, developed further by the 2008 Accra Agenda 
for Action and the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
(Paris/Accra/Busan agenda), saw all key bilateral and multilateral donors agree on 
principles and procedures – now endorsed by well over 100 partner countries – that 
significantly expand the regulatory framework of international aid and whose 
implementation will signify a quiet revolution of the aid system. What sort of crisis does 
the aid system find itself in? What does system reform look like? What results has it 
already achieved? And how is it evaluated from a theoretical perspective? These questions 
are addressed in the paragraphs that follow. 
2.1 The crisis in the aid system 
If, after almost six decades of dedicated work, actors in a policy area declare that drastic 
steps need to be taken in order to increases that area’s effectiveness, then there is a serious 
problem. After all, a policy is meant to be effective by definition, otherwise its legitimacy 
is called into question. For years, the effectiveness of development cooperation has been 
the subject of intense debate and efforts. On the one hand, the pressure on international aid 
to justify its existence has increased considerably (crisis of legitimacy), whereas on the 
other, the system has become so complex that it is being rendered increasingly 
dysfunctional. There is more awareness of inherent problems, which, while not all new, 
are becoming more prominent as criticism of the system grows. 
2.1.1 Legitimacy crisis in international aid 
There are two main reasons for the legitimacy crisis in international aid. The first is the 
unsatisfactory state of development in a large number of countries, many of which have 
received substantial amounts of aid despite the undeniable development progress made by 
other countries (see section 3). The second is the lack of – or disputed nature of – 
empirical evidence concerning aid effectiveness. 
The following indicators suffice to illustrate the unsatisfactory state of development: (i) 
although the proportion of people living in extreme poverty (on less than US$ 1.25 per 
                                                          
5 “We, Ministers of developed and developing countries responsible for promoting development and 
Heads of multilateral and bilateral development institutions [...] resolve to take far-reaching and 
monitorable actions to reform the ways we deliver and manage aid [...]. [...] we recognise that [...] aid 
effectiveness must increase significantly” (2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness). 
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day) fell by more than 50 per cent between 1990 and 2010,
6
 there were still 1.2 billion 
people living below this extreme poverty line in 2010, and the World Bank expects there 
to be 970 million people living in extreme poverty in 2015. If the extreme poverty line 
were set at US$ 2 per day, as many are calling for, then almost 2.5 billion people would 
have fallen into this category in 2008 (Chen / Ravallion 2012, 3, 6); (ii) although a range 
of countries that were in some cases counted as being among the world’s poorest nations 
in the 1950s have now become emerging economies, or even highly developed countries 
(South Korea being the foremost example), there are still 48 countries classified as least-
developed countries (LDCs), with three quarters of their total 880 million citizens living in 
poverty. Only three countries have managed to leave behind their LDC status over the last 
three decades (UN 2011b); (iii) 45 nations with a combined total of 1.2 billion citizens, 
among them many lower-middle-income countries, are classified as failing or failed states, 
in which basic governmental functions are either deficient or no longer existent (OECD / 
INCAF 2011). 
Against this backdrop, it would be somewhat premature to declare the mission of aid as 
being accomplished. However, this observation is only “reassuring” for the aid system at 
first glance, as it must still ask itself what it has actually achieved over the last few 
decades if the situation is still as unsatisfactory as indicated. Of course, the aid system can 
point to its being just one influencing factor among many, making it impossible to place 
all the blame for insufficient development progress – and even regression – at its door. 
Although this is true, it is not an entirely convincing argument, as aid has at certain points 
in the past accounted for a considerable amount of the gross national income of many 
LDCs and fragile states (in some cases more than 20 per cent).
7
 
However, the aid system is struggling to demonstrate its effectiveness. For a long time, 
aid actors have pointed to the resources they were deploying (inputs), the activities they 
were carrying out and the outputs they were providing as sufficient justifications for 
their work, especially as these things are relatively easy to document. Although it is now 
recognised that aid can only be considered effective when it has helped to bring about 
development progress (outcomes), allowing this belief to consistently inform the 
planning and implementation of aid interventions and the systematic evaluation of their 
impacts is still a significant challenge and, in the case of evaluation, a methodical one as 
well. Unfortunately, the numerous macro-quantitative analyses of aid effectiveness
8
 
                                                          
6 From 47 per cent in 1990 to less than 22 per cent in 2010 (UN 2013, 7). As a result, the UN considers 
Millennium Development Goal 1 (to halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people living in 
extreme poverty) to have been achieved ahead of time for the developing world as a whole. However, it 
has been achieved primarily in China and India. Sub-Saharan Africa is not expected to reach this target 
by 2015, despite some progress having been made (proportion of citizens living in extreme poverty in 
1990: 56 per cent; in 2010: 48 per cent; in 2015 (forecast): 36 per cent (UN 2013, 6; UN 2011a, 6–7)). 
7 In 2008, ODA accounted for between 5 and 10 per cent of gross national income in 25 developing 
countries, between 10 and 20 per cent in 15 developing countries, between 20 and 30 per cent in seven 
developing countries, and over 30 per cent in five countries (OECD / DAC 2010, 228–231). And when 
it comes to state budgets, the proportions are even higher. 
8 These international cross-section analyses use statistics to test whether there is a significant correlation 
between aid contributions and development (measured primarily in terms of growth in per capita in-
come or poverty reduction). During the 50 years in which they have been carried out, these analyses 
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have tended to lead to more confusion rather than greater clarity, doing nothing to help 
the aid system to justify its existence. 
2.1.2 Problems with the aid system 
These problems, some of which are mutually reinforcing, result from the institutional 
structure of the aid system and the way it operates. There are three main problems: (i) 
fragmentation of the aid system as a result of considerable donor proliferation and project 
fragmentation; (ii) a whole range of principal-agent problems stemming from the complex 
constellation of actors in the aid system; (iii) the potentially negative economic and, in 
particular, political impacts of heavy ODA inflows in countries heavily dependent on aid. 
The number of donors and projects has increased enormously at the global level and in 
individual recipient countries (World Bank 2008). Because of the large range of donors 
involved – often with different interests, priorities and procedures, as well as their own 
projects and programmes – transaction costs are substantial, partners are faced with a 
considerable administrative burden, and it is more difficult to coordinate donor 
contributions and integrate them into partners’ strategies in a way that maximises their 
effectiveness. This results in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness, and it undermines the 
ability of partners to exercise ownership and shape things as they see fit. 
From a principal-agent perspective,
9
 the aid system is a complex constellation of actors 
with two ideal types of principals: the taxpayers in the donor countries and the target 
groups of aid interventions in the partner countries, who, ideally, both share a common 
interest in development. However, this is no longer necessarily the case for the contracting 
authorities in the donor and partner countries (that is, parliaments that approve aid budgets 
and national development budgets, and governments that agree aid programmes and 
national development strategies), nor does it automatically hold true for donor and partner 
agents (that is, ministerial bureaucracies and their subordinate administrations, 
implementing organisations, project managers and consultants).
10
 This is where self-
interests come into play, with asymmetric incentives, information and responsibilities 
limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of aid. As the range of objectives being pursued 
increases, decision-making processes become less transparent and the constellations of 
actors more complex. Then the system becomes increasingly unable to live up to the 
expectations of its original principals. There is a whole host of evidence of this problem 
that provides a key argument for those who are fundamentally critical of aid. 
The negative impact of heavy ODA inflows into countries highly dependent on aid has 
been labelled from an economic perspective as “Dutch disease” (for an overview, see 
                                                                                                                                                                              
have yielded varying and, in many cases, contradictory results, and been the source of a great deal of 
controversy (McGillivray et al. 2006; Faust / Leiderer 2010; Alonso 2012, 11–12). 
9 See Ostrom et al. (2002), Martens et al. (2002), Gibson et al. (2005), and Faust and Messner (2010, 
260–270) among others; and from the fundamentally critical perspective, see also the authors 
mentioned in the introduction. 
10 In practice, there are a whole range of principal-agent relationships (tax payers–parliaments; parliaments–
governments; governments–implementing organisations; implementing organisations–project managers; 
project managers–target groups; clients–evaluators; bilateral donors–multilateral organisations). 
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Fielding / Gibson 2012), meaning that, unless macro-economic countermeasures are taken, 
heavy foreign currency inflows (e.g. from raw material exports and also from aid) tend to 
appreciate the currencies of partner countries, which has an adverse effect on export-
oriented sectors, thereby reducing their international competitiveness. From a political 
perspective, heavy ODA inflows run the risk of leaving recipient governments less 
accountable to their taxpayers, discouraging partner countries from taking action 
themselves (e.g. increasing domestic savings and collecting tax revenue), and promoting 
rent-seeking behaviour by governments, administrations and the private sector (for an 
overview, see Moss / Pettersson / van de Walle 2008). 
2.2 Reforming the aid system 
2.2.1 Context and phases of system reform 
Efforts to reform the international aid system – frequently referred to as the 
Paris/Accra/Busan agenda – form part of the more comprehensive international aid-
effectiveness agenda, the context in which they gained their momentum in the first place. 
Responding to a let-up in aid efforts (aid fatigue) in the 1990s – a time when awareness 
was growing about the potential dangers of ongoing development problems – the 
international community has adopted a number of resolutions since 2000 that assign 
development policy an important role in efforts to safeguard our global future and also 
seek to significantly improve aid effectiveness in light of the aid system’s inherent 
problems. 
These resolutions concern four aspects of development policy that, only when taken 
together, are crucial to its effectiveness: (i) goals as a content-based yardstick for 
measuring the effectiveness of development policy: the United Nations (UN) Millennium 
Declaration and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000/2001; (ii) 
resources for achieving the MDGs: the UN’s 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for 
Development and follow-up commitments by the European Union (EU) and the G7; (iii) 
principles and procedures designed to ensure effective resource deployment and thereby 
improve aid effectiveness: Paris/Accra/Busan agenda; (iv) policy coherence for 
development – that is, other policies support, or at the very least, do not obstruct, the 
impact of aid – and all policies help to resolve global development problems (recognised 
at the UN, OECD and EU levels and by numerous donor countries, including Germany). 
The Paris/Accra/Busan agenda, which aims to reform the aid system in a more narrow 
sense (item (iii)), is often wrongly equated with the international aid-effectiveness 
agenda. Strictly speaking, it represents just one dimension of aid effectiveness – being to 
some extent the operating system of international aid – and cannot be viewed in isolation 
from the other three dimensions. 
Reform of the international aid system thus far can be divided into two phases. The first 
phase ran up to the Accra High Level Forum (2008), being initiated and largely driven 
by the DAC
11
 of the OECD, which set up a special Working Party on Aid Effectiveness 
                                                          
11 Within the DAC, the OECD’s bilateral donors coordinate and review the aid they provide. Multilateral 
donors, including the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), have 
observer status and are involved in sub-groups. 
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(WP-EFF). The DAC members and DAC observers were joined in the WP-EFF by an 
initially small number of partner countries, civil society organisations and private 
foundations that grew following the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. 
Although the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action were adopted by a large 
number of partner countries and other actors, it was the OECD donors who were the 
driving force behind the WP-EFF. 
This changed during the second phase, which reached its climax at the Busan High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (2011). Despite broad acceptance of the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, the DAC was frequently criticised for its 
lack of universal legitimacy. Consequently, efforts were made following Accra to 
achieve a broader basis for reforming the international aid system. As the UN’s 
Development Cooperation Forum, set up in 2008, was not suitable for this purpose – due 
to differing interests within the UN and a lack of political support and institutional 
capacity – the WP-EFF continued its work. But, with silent acceptance by DAC 
members, it developed into a forum sui generis, incorporating a growing number of 
partner countries and other actors,
12
 and was chaired jointly by a representative of the 
OECD donors and a representative of the partner countries (Egypt) (for more 
information about the process, see Atwood 2012). After the OECD representative 
stepped down in 2011, the Egyptian partner country representative assumed sole 
chairmanship of the WP-EFF. The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-
operation was set up in Busan. Its institutional structure was defined in 2012, and it is 
due to be fully up and running in 2013 (see below). 
2.2.2 The first phase of system reform, driven primarily by the OECD 
With the groundwork laid in the form of the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) 
and the Marrakech Action Plan on Managing for Development Results (2004), the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness marked the first milestone in the reform of the 
international aid system. It was initially adopted in 2005 by some 30 bilateral donors, 25 
multilateral organisations, 60 developing countries and several civil society 
organisations. 
The Paris Declaration defines five principles for effective aid: ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability. It aims to see partner 
countries (with support from donors) creating the conditions for effective aid by 
exercising ownership, drafting operational development strategies with broad 
participation, establishing reliable public finance and procurement systems, and 
coordinating donor contributions. Donors commit to respecting the leadership roles of 
partner countries, bringing their contributions into line with the priorities, strategies, 
skills and procedures of their partners, and harmonising their own procedures. Donors 
and partners are both responsible and mutually accountable for managing aid with a 
                                                          
12 Following Accra, the WP-EFF was expanded to include five groups of actors: (i) countries in receipt of 
aid (24); (ii) countries both receiving and providing aid (7); (iii) OECD donors (30); (iv) multilateral 
organisations (9); (v) other members (5, including representatives of civil society and the Inter-
Parliamentary Union). See also Kindornay and Samy (2012, 5). 
Transformation of a policy area 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 7 
focus on results. The five principles were specified in the form of 56 commitments, 12 
of which were operationalised using indicators, with the time horizon set at 2010. 
Although many commitments (such as those to use the public finance and procurement 
systems of partner countries, to harmonise procedures and to practise the division of 
labour) can appear rather technical at first glance, they are quite sensitive politically, as 
they imply changes to the ways that actors allocate roles, go about their activities and 
pursue their interests. 
The principles that the Paris Declaration sets forth are by no means new. Ownership and 
alignment, for instance, correspond to the old principle of helping people to help 
themselves. What is new about the Paris Declaration is that, for the first time in the 
history of the aid system, it defines common principles and numerous procedural rules 
for a large number of donors and partner countries, thereby significantly expanding the 
international regulatory framework for aid. This framework incorporates targets, 
standards and guidelines that have been agreed by the UN, the OECD, the EU and other 
organisations. 
In light of the experience gained in implementing the Paris Declaration and the 
subsequent close examination of its contents by state aid providers, civil society and 
academia (for further details, please see Ashoff 2010a, 56–61), the Paris agenda was 
further developed in three regards at the 2008 Accra High Level Forum, giving rise to 
the Accra Agenda for Action. Firstly, it became more political. Two of the issues 
stressed in the Accra Agenda for Action were the important roles played by parliaments 
and civil society in partner countries and the fact that all policies are jointly responsible 
for achieving international development goals (policy coherence). Secondly, several of 
the commitments in the Paris Declaration were specified further (e.g. those to use the 
systems of partner countries, practise division of labour, carry out technical cooperation 
in a demand-driven way and untie aid). Thirdly, the Accra Agenda for Action pointed to 
the growing significance of other actors (emerging economies as new donors, global 
funds, private sector, civil society), as well as the related coordination problems, and 
called for more effective and inclusive partnerships with regard to the goal of poverty 
reduction. 
2.2.3 Results from the first phase of system reform 
Barely any other policy reform has undergone such comprehensive comparative analysis 
at the international level within just a few years of its inception as has the reform of the 
aid system, which was introduced in Paris and further developed in Accra. On the one 
hand, the implementation of the Paris Declaration was monitored by the OECD in three 
surveys carried out in 2007, 2008 and 2011. Although they only dealt with the 12 of the 56 
Paris commitments that had been operationalised, these surveys covered 33 donors and, 
ultimately, 78 partner countries. The OECD described the results as sobering, since just 1 
of the 12 commitments monitored had been met in full by 2010. That being said, 
significant progress had been made with the other commitments, particularly by the 
partner countries (OECD 2011a, 15). 
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On the other hand, both the implementation and effectiveness of the Paris/Accra agenda 
were examined through an independent evaluation carried out in two phases (2007–2008 
and 2009–2011). Although this evaluation took into account the results of the monitoring 
surveys, it went much further
13
 and is considered to be one of the most comprehensive
evaluations ever carried out in the history of international aid. The final report (Wood et 
al. 2011) synthesises the findings of more than 40 country studies (including 21 partner 
country studies) and several thematic studies. The evaluation results can be summarised as 
follows. 
Relevance of the Paris Declaration: The five principles and virtually all the commitments 
of the Paris Declaration were found to be relevant to improving aid effectiveness and 
applicable to all forms of international aid (hence including South-South cooperation, for 
example).
14
 This means that poor implementation cannot be attributed to fundamental
doubts about the relevance or usefulness of the commitments. 
Implementing the commitments (output level): Measured against the 2010 time horizon, 
implementation of the commitments had been slow on the whole, albeit with significant 
differences between the commitments and between individual donors and partner 
countries. Overall, donors made less progress than partner countries, despite fewer 
requirements and greater capacity.
15
 The evaluation had the following to say about the
five principles of the Paris Declaration: “country ownership has advanced farthest, with 
alignment and harmonization progressing more unevenly, and managing for development 
results and mutual accountability advancing least” (Wood et al. 2011, xv). 
13 Aid evaluations examine the following aspects of an intervention or programme: (i) relevance (fitness 
for purpose); (ii) implementation (delivery of the services stated, output level); (iii) direct results 
(outcome level); (iv) longer-term development impact (impact level); (v) sustainability of results. The 
OECD monitoring surveys in question only examined the output level (aspect (ii)), whereas the 
international evaluation of the Paris Declaration also dealt with relevance (aspect (i)), the system 
improvements achieved (aspect (iii)) and the development impact (aspect (iv)). 
14 The synthesis report is based on assessments by aid actors (donor and partner institutions operating 
within the aid system) surveyed as part of the country studies and reflects the fact that the principles 
and commitments of the Paris Declaration were not developed from theoretical concepts, but rather in 
response to problems that had emerged in aid practice over the course of many years (Wood et al. 
2011, xv, 10). This also explains the apparent contradiction between the evaluation, which confirmed 
the relevance of the Paris Declaration, and representatives from a range of theoretical backgrounds, 
who criticised the declaration (see 2.3 below). They are each using different frames of reference. 
15 Regarding progress made by donors, the main improvements had been as follows: less duplication of 
work, simpler procedures, more delegation of responsibility to their representatives in partner 
countries, greater accountability to their parliaments and the public, increased transparency, and 
reduced corruption. By contrast, reforms are needed when it comes to the incorporation of donor 
contributions into the budgets of partners, joint programme approaches, conditions and analyses, and 
the predictability of donor contributions. Most of the progress made by partners was in the drafting of 
national development strategies (albeit less so in the areas of operationalisation and budgetisation), in 
improvements to public financial management and procurement systems, and in the practice of 
managing for results. By contrast, barely any headway was made in terms of improving accountability 
to parliaments and citizens and fighting corruption (Wood et al. 2011, 19–22; OECD 2011a, 15, 19). 
Transformation of a policy area 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 9 
System improvements (outcome level):
16
 The evaluation painted a disappointing picture
with regard to aid efficiency, but was cautiously optimistic in its assessment of aid 
management and the issue of better partnerships. Initially, the reforms did not yield the 
expected decrease in aid transaction costs. Instead, costs often increased further (for 
donors more than partners) as a result of more complex coordination processes. However, 
according to the evaluation, these costs did not cancel out the positive changes. There had 
been some partial progress (see footnote 15) with regard to improving the management of 
aid compared with the situation pre-2005. The same applies to donor-partner relationships, 
which had been marked on the whole by increased ownership by partners, greater 
transparency and more systematic dialogue and cooperation. 
Development impact (impact level): This is ultimately the decisive yardstick, as the reform 
is not an end in itself. The results of the evaluation are very limited here. The synthesis 
report attributed this to three reasons. Firstly, little time had elapsed since the Paris 
Declaration had been adopted. Secondly, there had been significant barriers to 
development during this period. Thirdly, insufficient empirical evidence restricted the 
impact analysis. The health sector, which was examined more closely in partner country 
evaluations, was the only area in which the evaluation identified a positive development 
impact, with no such impact identifiable with regard to improving the situation of the 
world’s poorest. 
Conclusions reached by the authors of the synthesis study: (i) the progress that had been 
made and the fact that some donors and partners had made more headway than others 
mean that the path that they have all started down is passable, but difficult. It was 
unrealistic to expect very rapid and far-reaching reforms in just a few years; (ii) the 
deficits in implementation mean that the system reform agenda has yet to be completed. 
Consequently, the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness explicitly confirmed the 
commitments of the Paris/Accra agenda; (iii) nonetheless, the reforms must be adapted to 
a greater degree to the different circumstances of partner countries in terms of weighting, 
priority and time horizon, while also becoming more binding;
17
 (iv) the reform of the aid
system had produced a substantial superstructure of standards (Rome, Paris, Accra and 
Busan declarations and many other documents) and institutions (the growing number of 
increasingly large coordination forums). As it is the implementation of the reforms that 
counts, related efforts need to be more strongly focused on partner countries, since it is at 
this level that aid effectiveness has ultimately to be achieved. This can serve to streamline 
management of the process as a whole; (v) as the development impact of the system 
reform ultimately depends on the extent to which aid contributes to development progress 
and the results produced by the evaluation have so far been limited in this regard, greater 
efforts are needed to evaluate this aspect. 
16 In this context, the evaluation assessed the extent of improvements in three areas: aid efficiency, aid 
management and partnerships between donors and partners. 
17 The evaluation made a number of proposals in this regard, including the conclusion of longer-term 
agreements between partners and donors on goals and time horizons for reforms and donor 
contributions, as well as the establishment of annual forums to coordinate activities and enable 
mutual evaluation (Wood et al. 2011, xvii). These proposals were adopted in the Busan declaration 
in the form of country-specific results frameworks and the corresponding country-specific 
monitoring process (see below). 
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Two findings of the evaluation appear to be particularly important. Given that the 
principles and most of the commitments of the Paris Declaration have proven to be 
relevant for practical application, it is not necessary to set up a brand new programme to 
improve aid effectiveness. If this were necessary, then it would set the reform of the 
international aid system back several years. At the same time, the authors of the synthesis 
report pointed out quite rightly that because the changes being pursued concern a system 
that has developed over many years and call into question path dependencies and 
institutional interests, they are not simply technical in nature, but, ultimately, political. 
This does not discredit the route being taken with the reforms. International agreements 
governing a policy area tend to operate at the factual level, where problems manifest 
themselves. It is then up to the actors involved to implement the agreements at both a 
technical and political level, which can involve many different challenges. 
2.2.4 Phase 2 of system reform, up to the establishment of the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation 
The system reform was reviewed once more at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in Busan (South Korea) at the end of 2011 and developed further with the 
following results: (i) the commitments made in Paris and Accra were endorsed in full and 
new ones added, some with time horizons and some without. The signatories of the Paris 
Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action pledged to fully implement their existing 
commitments, as well as the new ones; (ii) important new aid actors, including the BRICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which had been on the outside 
prior to Busan, were integrated into the reform process, meaning the Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-operation
18
 could truly live up to its name. This had been a 
contentious issue until shortly before the end of the forum, with China in particular 
regarding the Paris agenda as OECD-driven and not considering itself bound by the 
commitments. The outcome document revealed “shared principles, common goals and 
differential commitments for effective international development” as the common 
denominators in the compromise that was reached. The new donors accepted that they 
were part of the reform process, recognising its goals and principles while at the same 
time seeing themselves as actors in South-South cooperation for whom the Paris and 
Accra commitments serve simply as voluntary guidelines; (iii) implementation will be 
monitored at two levels in the future: in partner countries on the basis of country-specific 
results frameworks, and globally using selected common indicators;
19
 (iv) the agenda was 
broadened from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. This was a conclusion 
drawn from the fact that other foreign resource flows (such as direct investment, 
remittances by migrants to their home countries and climate finance) and the private sector 
are playing an increasingly significant role in the development process alongside aid. Aid 
                                                          
18 This partnership has been endorsed by 158 countries, 39 international organisations (including Arab funds 
and global funds) and seven other organisations (including the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation). 
19 Ten indicators (some with operationalised targets for 2015) were agreed in mid-2012 for global 
monitoring. Some were taken from the Paris Declaration, whereas others are new (such as those 
relating to the enabling conditions for the involvement of development-oriented organisations from 
civil society and to gender equality).  
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is to act to a greater extent as a catalyst, ensuring that these flows and the private sector 
promote development wherever possible.  
The issue of the future institutional structure of the Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation was not resolved in Busan, but rather half a year later. The 
solution found in mid-2012 operates at three levels: ministerial meetings to be held every 
18 to 24 months; an 18-member steering committee representing all country and actor 
groups (traditional donors, non-traditional donors, partner countries, parliaments, civil 
society, the private sector); and a secretariat set up by the OECD and UNDP. The adoption 
of this solution marked the end of the WP-EFF. The steering committee has since met on 
several occasions, and the first ministerial meeting is scheduled for April 2014 in Mexico. 
The new Global Partnership represents a paradigm shift (Kharas 2012, 2) and a milestone 
(Sondermann 2012). It has been accepted by the traditional donors within the OECD, who 
have played a decisive role in shaping the international aid system over several decades by 
virtue of the size of their aid contributions and the standards they have set – namely, that 
international aid requires an inclusive framework in order to be effective, a framework that 
offers all relevant public and private actors from the Global North and the Global South an 
opportunity to make their voice heard, and to be involved. This transformation is seen in 
the disbanding of the WP-EFF after the new structure was adopted. This is something that 
very rarely occurs with international organisations, in conjunction with the fact that the 
OECD now has only one seat as an organisation on the steering committee. The Global 
Partnership will only succeed to the extent to which all parties – not least the emerging 
donors (BRICS countries and other partners of South-South cooperation) – take the new 
forum seriously and work together to find solutions (Besharati 2013). 
2.3 Evaluating aid system reform from a theoretical perspective 
Academic discussion of the reform of the aid system has so far been critical, especially 
from the perspective of political economics, institutional economics and governance.
20
 By 
contrast, there is another theoretical perspective that has barely been examined to date, and 
for which the reform provides an interesting case study, namely regime theory. 
2.3.1 Criticism from a political economics perspective 
This criticism is directed at the failure of the reform agenda to take power relationships 
into consideration (Hyden 2008) and at the technocratic understanding of the state and 
social processes in partner countries (Alonso / Garcimartín / Martin 2010, 40–42; Alonso 
2012, 15–16), seeing that there is a risk of expectations not being fulfilled regarding 
ownership and alignment. According to the critics, ownership cannot simply be taken for 
granted – it is a goal that first needs to be achieved in many cases. The Paris Declaration 
                                                          
20 Academic discussion of the transformation of development policy, the subject of this paper, has so far 
essentially focused on aid system reform within the context of the Paris Declaration, which is why this 
sub-section is included at this point. Owing to the diverse range of processes involved, there is no 
comparable focused theoretical examination of the changes in the system environment of development 
policy referred to in section 3 of this paper. 
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does not address the question of what to do in situations where there are insufficient levels 
of ownership (Booth 2011). Critics call for power relationships; political, economic and 
institutional interests; incentive systems; and reform constellations to be examined, and 
for aid agreements to be concluded on the basis of the best fit for specific countries, rather 
than on a general best-practice basis (as also proposed by Duncan / Williams 2012). 
Faust (2010) shares the criticism of the way the Paris Declaration addresses ownership. He 
is also unconvinced by calls made by civil society for the term to be developed into 
“democratic ownership”, seeing this as being even further removed from realities in many 
partner countries. He also sees a need to distinguish between policy ownership (broad 
political and societal consensus on long-term reform projects) and procedural ownership 
(broad consensus on the democratic principles for forming governments and formulating 
policy). According to Faust, the iterative and experimental nature of political decision-
making processes means that policy ownership is frequently absent even in developed 
countries. Consequently, he argues that, when it comes to their expectations of ownership 
by partner countries, donors should focus on procedural ownership, attaching conditions to 
this kind of ownership rather than to the submission of complex, long-term reform 
agendas. However, this argument is not entirely convincing. The fact that the international 
community has agreed on basic development goals in the Millennium Declaration that are 
binding on all its signatory states (and that are being further developed for the period after 
2015) is progress in itself. Even if reform processes are (potentially) iterative and 
experimental, a longer-term form of orientation is essential. 
2.3.2 Criticism from an institutional economics perspective 
This criticism is aimed at the failure of the Paris Declaration to resolve the principal-agent 
problems within the aid system. Critics claim that the principle of mutual accountability, 
in particular, fails to recognise the disparity in interests and responsibilities between the 
different actors. Two approaches have been put forward for helping to make aid more 
effective under these conditions. On the one hand, calls for greater transparency in the aid 
system have attracted more attention, reflected at the institutional level by the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative, which provides a global aid transparency 
standard. On the other hand, Birdsall and Savedoff (2010, 8–14, 17–18) have proposed the 
conclusion of agreements between donors and partners on specific development outcomes, 
with donors providing cash on delivery. Discussion of this approach has shown that it 
would appear promising in certain areas with stringent cause-and-effect chains (e.g. health 
care), but complicated to implement in other areas, where it risks having a disincentivising 
effect (Klingebiel 2011). 
2.3.3 Criticism from a governance perspective 
There are two points of criticism from this perspective (Faust / Messner 2010, 272–283; 
critical response by Ashoff 2010a, 58–60): (i) reform of the aid system has failed to 
achieve a reduction in the large number of donors required to directly overcome the 
fragmentation of international aid and the high transaction costs that result from it. It is 
true that there is no international agreement on the withdrawal of bilateral and 
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multilateral donors from the aid system. However, the Paris/Accra/Busan agenda calls 
upon donors to practise division of labour, which is something that the EU addressed in 
its 2007 Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development 
Policy, and which is nothing other than a clear call to reduce the number of donors 
operating in one country or sector; (ii) the Paris Declaration is assumed to be based on a 
planning illusion. What is needed is more operational competition between donors rather 
than harmonisation and sectoral fine-tuning by excessively large groups of donors. 
There are several points of misunderstanding in this second point. The commitment to 
harmonisation in the Paris Declaration refers to procedures (not concepts) and is a 
dictate of economic reason. Correctly understood programme-based approaches and 
sectoral and general budget support do not seek to achieve sectoral fine-tuning at all, but 
rather agreement on development goals at the sectoral and macro levels and on donor 
contributions. Operational competition is achieved when donors actually use the 
procurement systems of partners and when partners allow donor-financed services to be 
tendered at the international level. 
2.3.4 Considerations from a regime theory perspective 
The Paris/Accra/Busan agenda provides a case study of international regime formation 
that, with a few exceptions (e.g. Tatge 2008), has barely been discussed as such to 
date.
21
 Examining the reform agenda from a regime theory perspective is heuristically 
beneficial in two regards. Firstly, it is interesting with regard to the global governance 
discussion. A key criticism of regime theories pointed out by Messner and Nuscheler 
(2003, 10) related to the loss of synthesis as a result of concentrating on a large 
number of specialised regulations; therefore regimes can only produce selective and 
partially “regulated anarchy”. Taken at face value (if regime theorists actually fail to 
consider anything else outside of their regime framework), this criticism would surely 
be correct. However, in the continued absence of a comprehensive global governance 
architecture for effectively tackling global issues (of which there is currently little 
prospect), it can be helpful to look at the building blocks of such an architecture, 
regimes being one of them. 
What is striking about the Paris/Accra/Busan agenda is that it succeeded in getting a 
very large and diverse group of actors to commit to common principles, rules and 
monitoring mechanisms in order to solve a common problem. The challenge is now not 
so much to achieve input-oriented legitimacy – as its standards and principles are now 
globally recognised and its specific commitments broadly accepted after Busan – but 
rather output-oriented legitimacy (goal achievement). The regime has significantly 
shaped the international discourse on aid and, in a relatively short space of time, 
proven itself to be at least partially effective, with progress made in the way the aid 
system operates and a partial impact made on development (see section 2.2.3). Finally, 
the regime has made considerable headway in terms of expanding its framework, with 
                                                          
21 This may be due to the fact that regime theory was at its height in the 1980s and 1990s before 
being overshadowed by the concept of global governance, which sees international regimes as a 
building block in a more comprehensive global governance architecture (Messner / Nuscheler 
2003, 10). 
Guido Ashoff / Stephan Klingebiel 
14 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
the inclusion of non-governmental actors (creation of sub-regimes that are themselves 
changing the behaviour of the parties involved).
22
 In other words, progress can 
certainly be observed below the threshold of a comprehensive global governance 
architecture when it comes to tackling specific global problems. 
The regime theory perspective is also helpful in bringing the conditions for the success 
of the Paris/Accra/Busan agenda more sharply into focus. It is known from regime 
theory that the success of regimes depends on two key factors: firstly, the willingness 
of those involved to comply with the common rules as well as mechanisms to promote 
compliance, and secondly, a clear separation of the regime in question from other 
regimes (no overlaps or competing claims to validity).
23
 
As far as the first aspect is concerned, as with most regimes, the Paris/Accra/Busan 
process has no means of imposing sanctions where rules are violated, but rather can 
only attempt to exert peer pressure through its monitoring process. This approach 
represents a soft law, with no mechanism for issuing sanctions (Dann / Vierck 2012). 
The peer pressure effect is weakened by the fact that the monitoring indicators are just 
one part of the agenda. This was already true of the Paris Declaration (only 12 of the 
56 commitments were monitored using indicators) and also applies to the new 
indicators, valid until 2015, which, according to critics, fail to take any or sufficient 
account of some key aspects.
24
 However, the Paris and Accra agreements led two 
independent institutions (Center for Global Development and Brookings) to develop a 
more comprehensive approach to measuring aid quality (31 indicators) based on the 
indicators in the Paris Declaration. This resulted in the publication of an international 
ranking, first issued in 2010 and then again in 2012 (Birdsall / Kharas / Perakis 2012), 
which, while lacking official status, is nonetheless a useful reference document for 
debate. 
                                                          
22 Four indicators: 1. The originally inter-governmental approach of the Paris Declaration was 
broadened by: (i) recognising civil society organisations as actors in their own right within the 
international aid system; (ii) calling upon signatory states to observe the scope for action by civil 
society organisations; (iii) encouraging civil society to improve its own effectiveness as an aid 
actor. 2. The Paris Declaration provided significant impetus for the EU Code of Conduct on 
Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy (2007). 3. The same applies to 
the Global Aid Transparency Standard introduced in 2011 (developed by the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative, which was set up at the Accra conference in 2008; signatories by mid-
2012: 61 donors, 22 partner countries). The civil society initiative Publish What You Fund works 
to achieve greater transparency in the aid system and evaluates donors using the Aid Transparency 
Assessment. 4. As a result of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, international 
civil society organisations adopted the Istanbul Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness 
(2010) and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness (2011) in order to 
increase their own impact. 
23 It is not always possible to prevent overlaps between regimes and competition between standards 
and requirements. A range of solutions have been discussed for these cases (Arndt et al. 2010).  
24 For example, there are no indicators for measuring the reduction in donor fragmentation or the 
catalysing effect of aid on other resource flows and the private sector (Kharas 2012).  
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Regarding the separation of the Paris/Accra/Busan agreements from other international 
regimes, overlapping
25
 does not pose a problem, as it does between international 
environmental and trade agreements, for instance. Rather, there are synergies and the 
potential for further synergies. If we understand the Millennium Development Goals, 
their national implementation plans and their monitoring processes as an international 
regime, then, as mentioned, they provided significant impetus for the 
Paris/Accra/Busan agenda. Moreover, it is possible to make use of initiatives and 
agreements (sub-regimes) in related areas when implementing the Busan agreements.
26
 
 
2.3.5 Conclusions from the theoretical discussion 
Examination of aid system reform from the perspective of political economics, 
institutional economics and governance sheds light on different internal functional 
requirements and deficits of the reform, and rightly highlights the political nature of the 
process, even though not all the arguments are convincing. Regime theory draws attention 
to the international context of the reform process. It shows that a significantly larger and 
globally recognised framework for solving problems in the aid system has been created in 
the space of just a few years, and that, although this framework has brought some partial 
success already, it still needs to be implemented to a much greater extent. 
3 Development policy and aid against a backdrop of major changes in the 
system environment 
The aid system environment with regard to partner countries has never been stable or 
stagnant in the past, but has rather been determined by processes of differentiation. The 
debate about emerging economies in the 1970s and 1980s and subsequent debates about 
“anchor countries” and regional powers were already marked by a desire to replace the 
image of a homogeneous group of “southern” countries with differentiated analysis of the 
pace of development and distinct development models (e.g. Menzel 1992). It was only in 
the 2000s that momentum on the development front saw not only the differentiation 
process evolving rapidly, but also the existing global economic and political structures 
undergoing permanent change. 
                                                          
25 The emphasis in this context is on potential overlaps between international regimes. By contrast, 
there is indeed tension between some of the agreements of the Paris/Accra/Busan agenda and 
national standards and regulations. One example is the commitment made by donors in the Paris 
Declaration to make the greatest possible use of partner systems in the areas of public financial 
management and procurement. Some donors insist on using their own systems, arguing that there are 
deficiencies in partner systems. The Paris Declaration states that this argument is only justified 
where the systems of partner countries do not yet meet internationally recognised standards and calls 
upon donors to assist partners in bringing their systems into line with international standards.  
26 For example, the International Budget Partnership when it comes to aid transparency, and the New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition when it comes to encouraging the private sector to engage 
in activities that promote development (Kharas 2012). 
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3.1 Changes on the part of developing countries 
3.1.1 Geography of the momentum in development 
Viewed over several decades, the group of countries recognised by the OECD/DAC 
donors as aid recipients underwent extensive changes. Between 1970 and 2010, a total of 
15 recipients joined this group, whereas 35 recipients were taken off the list during the 
same period (OECD/DAC 2011, 225). On the one hand, these adjustments reflect political 
changes and assessments based on events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent need to include new countries as standalone recipients, and on new political 
conditions in the wake of such developments as the overturning of the apartheid system in 
South Africa. On the other hand, they reflect in the first instance the economic progress 
made by developing countries, as most of the countries removed from the list were those 
that had significantly increased their income (such as Qatar and Singapore). 
The increasing convergence between the development features of the industrialised world 
(OECD countries) and those of formerly non-industrialised countries is seen clearly in the 
admittance of South Korea to the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee in 2010. 
As such, this ongoing structural transformation is not limited to differentiating between 
“southern” countries, but rather involves the formation of new groups and coalitions of 
countries. Not only are the individual profiles of countries changing, but global discussion 
and negotiating processes are also evolving as a result (as can be seen in the establishment 
of the Group of 20 (G20), for instance), with new global constellations of actors and new 
perceptions of these groupings (rise of the Global South). 
Developing countries continue to be classified primarily according to income groups;
27
 
this is also true of the OECD/DAC recipient list and similar country categories. This kind 
of classification system is fundamental to aid provision, as it begins by establishing a 
potential group of recipients based on need and/or the lack of resources (i.e. countries 
falling below a specific income threshold). This approach is coming under increasing 
pressure for two reasons. Firstly, a fundamental transformation is taking place in the 
structure of global prosperity to the benefit of the “South”. The aid system uses a 
redistribution approach based on the assumption that the donor community possesses a 
large proportion of the world’s economic power and is prepared to provide some of this 
power to developing countries in the form of aid. At the same time, this model assumes 
that developing countries are considerably lacking in resources and therefore require aid. 
Consequently, the aid system is characterised by a North-South dichotomy. However, the 
traditional classification structure is giving an increasingly distorted reflection of reality. 
At the worldwide level, there was a significant displacement of global prosperity during 
the 2000s, and this structural transformation looks set to continue (Spence 2011; OECD 
2010). A number of countries in the “East” and the “South” have become the new centres 
of gravity for non-OECD economies. Developing countries such as China and Brazil have 
now become significant actors in the global economy. These changes in the world 
economy are tied in with a new constellation of global powers, with developing countries 
successively making claims to political power and being able to assert these claims. 
                                                          
27 One fundamental problem discussed since the 1970s is the way that development is measured. It is 
generally recognised that absolute income per capita and growth in economic productivity are 
insufficient as indicators of development, though still relevant nonetheless.  
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The second reason that the traditional approach is struggling is that existing country 
classifications do not sufficiently reflect differentiation processes. These classifications face 
some particular challenges. On the one hand, the economic dynamism of developing 
countries means that the distinction between these countries, OECD countries and other 
more advanced countries is increasingly fading or blurred. It is no longer suitable to classify 
countries as either developed or developing (Harris / Moore / Schmitz 2009). On the other 
hand, there is the question of how to adapt and further develop country categories, given the 
difference in the nature of development between countries experiencing dynamic growth at 
one end of the spectrum, and nations that are stagnating or barely have any momentum at 
the other. As such, conventional income groups are only meaningful to a limited extent. 
New country typologies such as the four-speed world model (Spence 2011) and the multi-
speed world approach used by the OECD Development Centre (OECD 2010, 2011b) have 
not yet progressed beyond a basic level of development and are only able to overcome 
methodical and content-related problems (growth basis etc.) to a limited degree. 
Although the number of poor and stagnating countries is decreasing, a core group meeting 
the aid allocation criteria of need is set to remain for the foreseeable future. Statistical data 
for LDCs does not sufficiently map the changes that have taken place.
28
 Some significant 
changes took place during the 2000s in the group of LDCs and LICs (low-income 
countries). This is especially true within the sub-Saharan Africa region, which is 
particularly important for the group of LDCs and LICs (Radelet 2010). 
Across the board, stagnating and regressing countries are characterised by fragile 
situations. In a great many cases, a lack of state structures, poorly functioning or 
insufficiently legitimate governments, and related problems are the main reasons for 
countries failing to progress in their development. Fragile situations can include 
particularly complex cases of failed states, but also of vulnerable systems. In these cases, 
although state structures may exist, it may not be possible in certain regions of a country, 
for instance, for the state to enforce its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, or for 
state representatives to achieve a sufficient degree of legitimacy. Fragile states are marked 
by instability, insecurity, deficits in governance and limited implementation capacity. As a 
result, there is little prospect of success for longer-term aid approaches, the primary goals 
being to contribute to stability and to provide basic public services. 
On the whole, the number of countries that can be prioritised as aid recipients is 
decreasing as a result of structural changes. The graduation of countries results in aid 
having a diminishing impact on recipients on the whole (measured in terms of its 
contribution to the economic power of a country, for instance) and developing countries 
categorising themselves as aid recipients less frequently. Added to this are the voluntary 
commitments of partners and international aid standards (target values for poor countries 
etc.), which tend at least to counteract the continued provision of support to more 
advanced countries. 
  
                                                          
28 This data only shows three countries that have moved out of the LDC group in the past (UNCTAD 
2011). 
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3.1.2 Characteristics of poverty 
For the aid system, poverty reduction has been the principle underlying development-
policy activities ever since basic needs and poverty became focal issues of aid in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Analyses by a number of experts – including development economists Jeffrey 
Sachs (2005) and Paul Collier (2008) – in the 2000s served to reinforce and further 
develop this paradigm. These analyses led development-policy actors to strive to focus aid 
activities to an even greater extent on poverty and on the MDGs by making allocation 
decisions that favoured poor countries (LDCs or LICs) and recipients in sub-Saharan 
Africa. The functional and regional characteristics of aid provision were seen as largely 
overlapping. At the same time, analyses were characterised by the assumption that poor 
countries (often characterised by fragility) largely coincided with poor population groups. 
Consequently, it was long believed that, by focusing its activities on poor countries, the 
aid system was focusing on poverty reduction. 
Many of the assumptions and premises underlying the debate need to be re-evaluated in 
light of statistical evidence gathered from 2010 onwards. 
The problem of global poverty is becoming less significant over time: When looked at 
over a longer period of time, poverty is decreasing, both in absolute (number of people in 
poverty) and in relative (proportion of population in poverty) terms. Some 1.29 billion 
people lived on less than US$ 1.25 a day in 2008; this figure was as high as 1.94 billion in 
1981. In proportional terms, 22 per cent of the population in developing countries lived 
below this threshold in 2008, whereas as many as 52 per cent did in 1981. The MDG 
relating to poverty (MDG 1) was already achieved in 2010. Progress in global poverty 
reduction is due in large part to falling levels of poverty in China alone.
29
 
Poverty is not a phenomenon limited to poor countries, but rather primarily a challenge 
for middle-income countries: The analyses by Sumner (2010, 2012) have shown that there 
has been a significant change in the distribution of poor people in low-income and middle-
income countries, in contrast to analyses by others such as Collier (2008) (The Bottom 
Billion). Most of the world’s poor do not live in poor nations, but in middle-income 
countries (MICs). In 2007/2008, 72 per cent of poor people lived in MICs, whereas 20 
years previously, just 7 per cent did (the corresponding figures for LICs are 28 per cent 
and 93 per cent, respectively). These changes are due in large part to statistical effects and 
categorisations, particularly to the progression of countries from LICs to MICs. 
Nonetheless, these changes are highly relevant to aid allocation decisions, for instance, 
given development-policy requirements (e.g. focusing aid on poor countries). 
Broadening the poverty agenda – development paradigms: The debate about 
development-policy paradigms already went beyond a narrow definition of poverty and 
income poverty in the past. Nohlen and Nuscheler (1982), for instance, introduced a 
multidimensional system of targets (the “magic pentagon”). In development-policy 
practice, the concept of “human development” and the “human development index” 
(promoted by the Human Development Report, which has been issued by UNDP since 
1990), in particular, provided a competing approach to the growth-fixated development 
                                                          
29 cf. Chen and Ravallion (2012). For a critical evaluation of World Bank poverty analyses, see Loewe 
and Rippin (2012). 
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model that had dominated up until that time and that had been promoted particularly 
vigorously by the World Bank. There are two essential conceptual developments that are 
important here, not least against the backdrop of increasing incomes in many developing 
countries and the emergence of new middle classes. Firstly, the question of the 
environmental sustainability of development models (resource consumption, emissions 
etc.) is of fundamental importance, given the levels of economic progress (WBGU 2011). 
Any development paradigm that does not incorporate limitations based on natural 
environmental conditions is neglecting fundamental conditions. Secondly, intrastate 
aspects of distribution are becoming even more significant. Dynamic growth during the 
2000s has led in many cases to growing inequality. This is highly significant at the 
political level due to the rising expectations of burgeoning middle classes. Questions of 
social cohesion are therefore key to development processes (OECD 2011b). 
3.2 Changing the way global problems are addressed 
Academic and political debates on the future of aid start with the assumption that aid 
actors are under pressure to adapt their operations to the highly dynamic environment in 
which they work. There are a wide range of factors determining the extent to which 
medium-term and long-term internal system reforms and approaches for overcoming the 
system are addressed. Several debates start with existing deficits in the way global 
challenges are being tackled. Overall, the procedure for tackling global challenges at the 
national, regional and global levels is fragmented and, in places, patchy. It is true that 
there are a large number of actors dealing with development-policy tasks. However, these 
actors are working within a fragmented and poorly coordinated system that can only be 
steered to a limited extent, even where transaction costs are high (see section 2). At the 
same time, many of the policies impacting developing countries are poorly coordinated 
and fail to fully implement insights from debates on development-policy coherence. When 
it comes to more effectively coordinating global policies and dealing with potentially 
conflicting objectives (e.g. environmental sustainability versus resource consumption 
resulting from economic growth processes), efforts so far have only scratched the surface. 
Concepts for changing the way global problems are addressed can be divided broadly into 
two categories. The first kind of concept is outlined against a development-policy 
backdrop and includes a range of proposals that would fall under the heading “beyond 
aid”. These proposals seek to advance the aid system and embed it more firmly in the 
context of other development efforts. The second kind of concept deals as a whole with 
new patterns of international cooperation and primarily comprises global governance 
research (e.g. Messner / Nuscheler 2003). Discussions about global public goods have 
made a particular contribution to innovation in problem solving. 
3.2.1 Beyond aid 
Debates about beyond-aid issues seek to move away from an aid-centric focus in 
cooperation with developing countries (Klingebiel 2013). This prevents most of these 
approaches working from the assumption that aid or aid-like approaches are needed. There 
are three essential strands to the discussion. 
Guido Ashoff / Stephan Klingebiel 
20 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
Significance of the policies of partner countries: In some cases, debates on aid are so 
narrow that they give a distorted view of political responsibilities for development 
progress or the lack thereof, underestimating the significance of the relevant structures of 
responsibility in partner countries and overestimating the role of external actors and, in 
particular, of donors. In positive cases, aid can facilitate and support development 
processes. Nonetheless, the decisive policies, reforms and changes that promote 
development stem primarily from the relevant actors in the partner countries themselves 
(Kharas / Makino / Jung 2011). A distorted perception of the role of national actors can 
have many different implications. For example, if governments are largely dependent on 
aid to finance their budgets and activities, this can contribute to deficits in their countries’ 
political accountability structures. For instance, governments can order their activities in 
such a way as to make themselves primarily answerable to donors, and not – or 
insufficiently – accountable to their own populations (Klingebiel / Mahn 2011). 
Consequently, mobilising developing countries’ own resources in the form of taxes is 
relevant not only with regard to the amount of finance available, but also in terms of 
governance structures. For this reason, the discussion about beyond-aid approaches 
examines the mobilisation of indigenous resources and the impact this has on governance. 
Aid as a catalyst: Aid is provided with the assumption that it complements other 
development resources and that related investments would not be made or would be more 
limited without it. It is also assumed that aid should have the effect of mobilising other 
sources of finance. That is, aid should help to crowd in – rather than crowd out – other 
resources. It is virtually impossible to show either in general terms or in specific cases 
whether aid really does have such a catalytic effect. No recognised evidence has been 
provided so far to show that aid makes a general contribution to economic growth (i.e. that it 
generates additional resource flows). In fact, regression analyses have given rise to 
conflicting interpretations (Barder 2011). There is also uncertainty as to the ways in which 
individual investments and cooperation projects between public and private aid actors 
(public-private partnerships) crowd out resources, and reinforce or incentivise investment 
activity (Rogerson 2011). 
Coherence of donor policies and international regimes: Development policy coherence is 
based on a recognition that, with regard to external actors, there are other policies besides 
aid that affect global development and the development of partner countries, and that, in 
many cases, these policies are actually more dominant than aid flows (e.g. a country’s 
degree of integration into the global market, its foreign trade structure and the impact of 
foreign direct investment). In negative terms, policy coherence means the absence of 
incoherence, that is, of contradictions and the mutual obstruction of various policies (e.g. 
the potential negative effects of EU agricultural subsidies on developing countries). In 
positive terms, it refers to the way that policies work together to benefit development 
(such as when migrants transfer money back to their home countries) (Ashoff 2010b).
30
Questions of coherence are also of central importance at an international systems level 
(Kaul et al. 2003). Development policy can be affected just as much by an absence of 
regimes (e.g. in the area of international migration policy) as it can by existing 
international regimes (e.g. the international system of trade). Whether present or absent, 
30 The Commitment to Development Index, published regularly by the Center for Global Development, 
quantifies the efforts of donor countries, including those to increase coherence in development policy 
(http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/). 
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these regimes can lead either to incoherence or to greater coherence in development 
policy. 
3.2.2 Global public goods 
The concept of public goods comes from the field of economics and initially referred to 
the level of individual countries. Since the end of the 1990s, Inge Kaul and others have 
developed it further to produce approaches based on global public goods (GPGs) (Kaul et 
al. 2003; Kaul 2010, 2013; Severino / Ray 2009, 2010). Unlike private goods, public 
goods cannot simply be manipulated in such a way as to exclude others from using them 
or to limit their use to certain groups or individuals. Rather, public goods are available to 
everyone, for example, in the form of security (the police service, for instance) or public 
transport infrastructure (pavements, roads, traffic signs etc.). Many spheres of life and 
policies have become increasingly cross-border in nature over the last few decades, 
providing enormous momentum for regionalisation and, in particular, globalisation. Many 
public goods can either no longer be provided or can only be provided to a very limited 
extent at the national level. This is especially true of security (violence and crime 
phenomena) and the protection and conservation of the natural environment (e.g. clean 
water). There are a number of differences between various GPGs, for example, with 
regard to the issue of whether or not users can be excluded from using them (excludability 
/ non-excludability) and whether a GPG can be used at the expense of other users (rivalry / 
non-rivalry). Many GPGs are not provided to the necessary extent or are liable to being 
overused, one reason being that free-riding can also count as a rational model for state 
action. International cooperation relationships face the twin challenge of a proliferation of 
actors and fragmented approaches to solving problems. This makes managing GPGs a key 
task, which is why Severino and Ray (2010) claim that new forms of collective action 
(“hypercollective action”) will be needed (e.g. multi-actor coalitions that would facilitate 
joint action beneficial to GPGs). 
Providing GPGs requires cross-border action at the regional or global level, such as 
activities to mitigate or counteract the consequences of climate change. An international 
approach focused on GPGs is relevant to the aid system for two reasons. Firstly, demand 
for these kinds of policies and programmes in which several states have a collective 
interest is increasing. Creating and financing these goods is difficult at many different 
levels; states too are influenced by incentives to refrain from being involved in the 
provision of public goods (tragedy of the commons). Secondly, public goods such as these 
that are provided as part of aid programmes are not in the direct self-interest of the donors 
funding them. So far, the relevant services have been overwhelmingly geared towards 
assisting a specific country in its development process, without necessarily producing a 
global good. By contrast, the provision of GPGs is usually much more in the direct self-
interest of the donors involved. It may even be the case that such activities are not an 
immediate priority for the country in which they are carried out. Consequently, it is 
helpful to distinguish between GPGs that are in the collective interest of all actors 
involved (e.g. initiatives for mitigating the effects of climate change) on the one hand and 
services that are primarily intended to benefit the development of the country in which 
they are delivered (such as initiatives for providing basic social services) on the other. At a 
fundamental level, making increased use of aid to fund “pure GPGs” carries the latent risk 
of frustrating the original purpose of promoting development at the national level. 
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3.2.3 Proliferation and fragmentation of actors 
Since the beginning of the 2000s in particular, there has been an acceleration in the trend 
towards the simultaneous proliferation and fragmentation of actors providing aid and 
other forms of international cooperation (Severino / Ray 2010). There are several aspects 
to this trend. 
In those areas of international cooperation not attributable or only attributable in part to 
aid, donors (their respective government ministries) are increasingly establishing other 
approaches to cooperation and proposing forms of cooperation that mainly serve the 
interests of a specific sector. These cooperation models may deal with a range of matters, 
including issues of international security, environmental and research policy. For example, 
the volume of climate finance equates to around two-thirds of the total volume of aid 
provided by OECD/DAC members, meaning it has reached almost the same dimension.
31
The circle of multilateral aid institutions and EU donors has become even larger. There 
are 263 international institutions that offer multilateral aid, leading Reisen (2009) to 
describe it as a “non-system”. The high number of providers is due in part to vertical 
funds, an increasing number of which have been set up since the 1990s, some of them 
endowed with considerable sums of money. Vertical funds are earmarked for specific 
issues, meaning that they can respond relatively quickly and flexibly to new topics in a 
targeted manner (one example is the Global Fund, which is focused on reducing 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria). New EU donor countries include Poland and 
Lithuania, which provide small amounts of aid and contribute to the proliferation process. 
As “new donors”, dynamic middle-income countries such as China, India, Brazil and 
South Africa are of great interest in political and academic debates, given the considerable 
momentum they generate and the political implications of their involvement. Their 
cooperation activities with other developing countries are described as South-South 
cooperation, already signalling an aspiration for horizontal cooperation relationships 
(rather than traditional vertical cooperation between North and South). What distinguishes 
these countries from traditional donors is that they have an explicitly different 
understanding of development (Bräutigam 2009). This is seen, for example, in the way 
they seek to refrain from getting involved in matters of political dialogue (political non-
interference). These new donors usually highlight the mutual benefits of cooperation. For 
example, they emphasise their own economic interests to a greater extent and intentionally 
link aid with commercial instruments, whereas DAC donors seek to avoid mixing the 
interests of development policy with those of foreign trade, at least with regard to aid 
standards (the requirement to untie aid etc.). New donors often give prominence to 
infrastructure projects as part of their aid activities (transport infrastructure, energy 
projects, construction of public buildings etc.). Resource-rich countries such as Angola, 
Nigeria and Sudan are also important to new donors as cooperation partners. On the 
whole, new donors intentionally refrain from adopting the aid logic of the DAC donor 
group (Chaturvedi / Fues / Sidiropoulos 2012; Klingebiel 2013). 
31 The volume of climate finance is estimated to be at least US$ 97 billion per annum (Buchner et al. 
2011). According to the OECD, the ODA volume for 2011 stood at US$ 133.5 billion. 
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Arab donors differ from new donors in two regards. Firstly, donors such as Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have been involved in development policy activities 
since the 1970s. Secondly, this aid has been provided primarily as an expression of political 
solidarity with other Arab countries, which means that this cooperation is comparatively 
specialised in nature (Zimmermann / Smith 2011, 730f.; Walz / Ramachandran 2011, 11ff.). 
Finally, private foundations and philanthropic donors have been entering the aid arena in 
increasing numbers since the 1990s, financing their work through endowment funds. By 
the end of the 2000s, the work of these foundations had reached tangibly substantial 
levels, equating to around 6 to 8 per cent of aid provided by OECD/DAC donors. The Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation, currently the largest foundation, outstrips much smaller 
public donors such as Finland and Portugal (Lundsgaarde 2010). 
3.3 Different types of development finance 
Development finance is undergoing a process of transformation; its structure reflects the 
radical changes taking place in the aid system environment in terms of the extensive 
differentiation processes within and between development regions and the dynamics 
produced by external conditions. Four features can be identified with regard to 
development financing (Adugna et al. 2011; Walz / Ramachandran 2011; Zimmermann / 
Smith 2011). 
Firstly, there has been a significant increase in private financial flows, particularly in the 
form of foreign direct investment, during the 1990s and 2000s. Viewed as a whole, these 
flows represent the most important external contribution to development finance. This 
applies first and foremost to more advanced countries (MICs), which are now only 
dependent to a small extent on aid. Poor countries (LICs / LDCs) are also receiving more 
private finance, although this has not yet outstripped public flows in terms of volume. For 
example, foreign direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa stood at US$ 37 billion in 2011, 
with the volume of aid for the region coming to US$ 48 billion in the same year.
32
 
Secondly, there was also a significant increase in the volume of aid provided during the 
2000s against the backdrop of development-policy commitments made by key OECD 
countries, among other things. However, these aid volumes decreased in real terms in 
2011 and 2012.
33
 Aid subsidies continue to be the most important source of development 
finance for poor countries (LICs). 
Thirdly, payments transferred by migrants back to their home countries (officially 
recorded payments and informal figures) are making an increasingly significant 
contribution to development finance. The majority of these migrants do not work in 
OECD countries, but rather in nations (often neighbouring developing countries) that are 
                                                          
32 Figures for foreign direct investment calculated based on OECD (2013, 50). ODA figures taken from: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/Africa%20-%20Development%20Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202 
013.pdf (accessed 29 May 2013). 
33 The volume of ODA in 2012 stood at US$ 126 billion. For the data, please see: 
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aidtopoorcountriesslipsfurtherasgovernmentstightenbudgets.htm 
(accessed 14 May 2013). 
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comparatively more prosperous than their own. Estimates put the volume of official 
payments received from abroad in 2010 by people living in developing countries at around 
US$ 325 billion (ODI / DIE / ECDPM 2013, 171). 
Fourthly, new donors are becoming increasingly important in terms of the available 
volume of development finance. It is not possible to obtain complete data on this group, 
and the criteria needed for comparison (e.g. to see whether development assistance fulfils 
the aid criteria of the DAC) with OECD statistics, for instance, is not available in many 
cases. At the same time, it can be seen that aid from these new donors increased 
significantly in the 2000s and that, in many cases, it is highly relevant and visible in 
individual partner countries and within specific sectors.
34
 
3.4 Conclusions for debates about aid concepts and for development research 
The changes that have taken place in the aid system environment during the two decades 
following the end of the East-West conflict represent a process of further profound 
structural change. The nature of these changes became clear early on (take the debates 
about emerging economies in the 1970s, for instance), but the changes themselves have 
become far more dynamic and wider in scope since 2000. This structural transformation 
has considerable implications for aid, and yet is far more wide-reaching, as it affects 
development research and key areas of international relationships. There are three 
relevant dimensions to be considered here. 
Aid in the context of international forms of cooperation with developing countries: Aid 
is likely to become less significant and influential than it has been to date as the key 
instrument of cooperation with many developing countries. Policies are becoming 
increasingly interlinked, global challenges are growing, (former) developing countries 
are able to exert more influence and traditional industrialised nations are losing their 
global influence – all of which is fuelling the trend whereby aid is continuing to lose its 
status as the dominant form of international cooperation between the North and the 
South. In poor countries at least, aid will continue to play an important role in the 
medium term (10 to 20 years) as a transfer instrument. But even in these countries, other 
policies and their cooperation approaches (climate change mitigation initiatives etc.) will 
become increasingly significant, with the circle of cooperation actors continuing to 
increase (South-South cooperation, the role of private actors etc.). In highly dynamic 
countries able to move up the development ladder, options for using aid will presumably 
decrease tangibly. Development-policy approaches are likely to be integrated into other 
types of international cooperation relationships (GPG approaches etc.) in such cases. 
When it comes to the remaining group of aid-recipient countries, it will still be 
necessary to remedy deficits in the aid system (fragmentation etc.) on the one hand (see 
section 2), and to transfer this cooperation approach in the longer term to a more 
                                                          
34 It is estimated that the BRICS countries provided around US$ 3.9 billion of aid, or the equivalent of 3 
per cent of the aid volume provided by OECD/DAC countries, in 2009. However, the volume of this 
aid is increasing rapidly, and cooperation with individual countries (such as Ethiopia) and in areas of 
infrastructure is particularly significant in many cases (Adugna et al. 2011, 18–21). 
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comprehensive multilateral system (global governance) with other global public policy 
goals on the other. Consequently, aid approaches will continue to be rational in LICs 
initially, particularly in those that are stagnating or classified as fragile. Fundamental aid 
issues (aid effectiveness etc.) will remain relevant in these countries. As a result, 
explanatory gaps, such as those relating to cause and effect (the impact of aid on growth 
etc.), and related questions about allocation decisions (such as the decision to focus on 
“weak” or “dynamic” countries) will continue to be of relevance to development 
researchers, even if they now apply to a smaller core group of developing countries. 
Transforming a dichotomous and vertical cooperation approach into multiple forms of 
cooperation: As an instrument of international cooperation, aid is based largely on a 
dichotomous and vertical structure of “donors” and “recipients”. This structure of 
cooperation is losing acceptance, at least in part, and is becoming less precise as a result 
of differentiation processes. This means that attempts being undertaken to integrate new 
donors into the regulation system of the old aid world are unlikely to be very effective. 
Looking at the cooperation relationships of China and India, it does not appear that the 
two countries will allow themselves to be integrated into the existing structures of the 
OECD/DAC group of donors and, consequently, into the traditional aid system. As far 
as the actors involved are concerned, the various forms of South-South cooperation do 
not belong under the aid-effectiveness regime that was established in the 2000s. For 
other global negotiation processes too, such as the one on a possible follow-up 
agreement to the Millennium Development Goals, it will be impossible – or only 
possible to a limited extent – to effectively define new global framework conditions 
unless all the relevant actors work together to shape, promote and support the processes. 
Set up relatively recently, the G20 is helping to create new global governance structures. 
However, it has not yet managed to ensure sufficient involvement of the relevant global 
actors (or fields of development policy). All in all, it looks likely that a wider range of 
cooperation instruments will be developed and that aid standards and rules will become 
less significant, with increased competition from other forms of international 
cooperation in the longer term. 
Inequality and cohesion within and between states as the focus for development 
research: Development research work will need to focus to an even greater extent on 
differentiation processes, both those that have been concluded and those that are 
ongoing, in the future. These processes are leading to the break-up of previously 
dominant vertical structures (North and South) on the one hand, but are failing to 
fundamentally tackle economic and social divides at the international level and within 
individual countries on the other. Instead, structures are emerging that continue to be 
characterised by disparity and, at the same time, by open and versatile groups of 
countries. In this sense, dynamic development phenomena, such as the “East Asian 
Miracle”, are not exceptional one-off occurrences, but rather an essential feature of 
dynamic global development processes. 
The dynamism that gave rise to an enormous economic convergence process in the 
2000s, not least involving highly populated countries, entails considerable changes for 
the affected societies. For some population groups, it has brought with it an enormous 
increase in household incomes, social and public services, and consumerism. 
Consequently, differentiation processes within states are also highly significant with 
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regard, for example, to population groups within countries that remain in poverty, and 
the simultaneous income momentum generated by sectors of the population that benefit 
to a greater extent from growth processes, and therefore become part of the new middle 
classes in these countries. 
It is only possible to gain a rough impression of the implications of global economic 
convergence processes (Rodrik 2011; Spence 2011), yet these processes encompass 
fundamental social and political issues (the impact of social and economic inequality 
and cohesion, the influence of growth processes on political participation etc.), as well 
as basic questions about the environmental sustainability of economic success (planetary 
boundaries). In the same way that the traditional OECD world used to provide a model 
for developing countries (e.g. the model of regional integration provided by the 
European Union), the dynamic economies of the MICs have in large part become role 
models for countries that have so far achieved little or no economic progress. 
Development-policy models of traditional donors could become even less attractive 
going forward as a longer-term consequence of the global financial crisis that has been 
ongoing since 2008 (Birdsall 2011). 
Development research is implicitly based on the existence of a group of countries with 
common features (developing countries). This country-based typology will only be of 
limited usefulness in the future as a result of differentiation processes (Greig / Hulme / 
Turner 2007). Development research will need to focus less on issues relating to 
developing countries and more on open country typologies or the formation of new 
typologies. It should therefore shift its fundamental emphasis even further towards 
issues of inequality and cohesion within and between states. 
4 Conclusion 
Aid system reform takes some account of ongoing structural changes, for example, by 
creating new categories for “new donors” (take the Busan Partnership document, for 
instance). The aid system is responding to global structural changes as a whole by 
making adjustments. Nevertheless, given the fundamental changes taking place in the 
system environment, it is almost impossible to identify any overarching, new approaches 
to international cooperation that take into account all relevant policy areas. The upheaval 
in the system environment goes far beyond the sphere of aid operations. Even though the 
aid system is developing further, its ability to take account of and organise international 
cooperation relationships is limited. Aid is becoming less attractive and significant to 
partner countries, with many cooperation relationships no longer determined by aid logic 
(Klingebiel 2013). 
The rationale and environment of the aid system have been constantly changing since it 
came into being in the 1950s and 1960s. Structural transformation, particularly that 
which took place in the 2000s, shows not only that aid is in an ongoing state of 
development and adaptation as a policy area, but that it is undergoing a fundamental 
shift of orientation in its key functions. However, it does not follow that these reforms 
and changes are automatically consistent; in fact, they are often contradictory. 
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On the one hand, the debate on aid effectiveness demonstrates a clear desire to further 
develop and professionalise the policy area with regard to its original key task of 
contributing to development processes in developing countries. On the other hand, at no 
point since it was set up has the aid system been free of tension and interests. Rather, it 
has actually been dominated in many cases by foreign-policy and economic expediency. 
The debate on aid effectiveness and the international negotiation processes it entails 
have led to a reform of the aid system through improved quality standards. Nevertheless, 
there are some donor practices that make it difficult for aid organisations to reform. The 
rationality of aid actors is primarily based on the proliferation, fragmentation and 
continuation of aid implementation structures. Additionally, the conditions laid out by 
partner countries for increasing effectiveness are not uniform and, in many cases, are not 
conducive to development (role of clientelistic and neo-patrimonial structures etc.). 
At the same time, the Paris/Accra/Busan agenda provides only a piecemeal reflection of 
the realities of increasingly complex cooperation relationships. This is the result of a 
number of trends. Firstly, the number of classic aid partners is decreasing significantly. 
Consequently, planning, management and allocation processes within development 
policy, such as those forming part of poverty strategies, are set to become even less 
significant in the medium term. Secondly, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of actors engaged in cooperation relationships with developing countries. This 
has served to increase competition between actors and reduce the influence of classic 
donors. Thirdly, the aid instruments of traditional OECD donors are no longer the only 
definitive international standard. Donors such as China and India do not consider 
themselves to be bound in any way by classic standards set by bodies such as the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee. Cooperation instruments are more diverse 
and are often more complex with regard to the role of public and private as well as 
concessional and non-concessional resources. Fourthly, all external actors are 
increasingly competing for their interests in different globally-focused policy areas. This 
is true of international environmental policy (climate finance), the reinvigoration of 
strategic interests in raw materials and security policy, for example. Finally, the 
structural impact of the financial crisis that began in 2008 is still by no means 
foreseeable. Nonetheless, it can be assumed that the crisis represents a caesura in many 
respects. It raises questions relating not only to direct medium-term resource levels for 
aid policy (impact of austerity measures etc.), but also to international patterns of 
cooperation (possible incentives for GPG approaches) and to the exemplary nature of 
development paths. It is to be expected that the global financial crisis and related crisis 
management activities will serve to reduce the acceptance and attractiveness of 
traditional donors and their development models. 
All in all, this means that analysing and reflecting on the aid debate is about far more 
than simply examining technocratic development matters. Rather, it reflects the 
considerable need to redefine development research and to provide orientation for 
tackling questions of development theory that address significant changes in the system 
environment of the development regions. 
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